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CAN YOU SEE AND HEAR US, MS. SMITH?: 
PROTECTING DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN USING AUDIO AND VIDEO 
CONFERENCING IN JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
IVAYLO VALCHEV* 
As new technology is developed and older technology upgraded, people 
find new efficiency and flexibility in virtually every aspect of their personal 
and professional lives.  The judiciary and broader legal profession have 
found the influx of technology just as useful as other professions.  However, 
as new technology continues to reshape the practice of law, we must be 
cognizant of its effect on judicial proceedings and vigilant in protecting basic 
Constitutional guarantees, especially for criminal defendants.  While the 
twenty-first-century courtroom is wired to bring efficiency and flexibility to 
the practice of law, the very core of the judicial process is not modern 
displays but a document ratified in 1788.  This Comment discusses how one 
emerging technology—audio and video conferencing—poses a risk to the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.  The Comment advances three main 
arguments.  First, the use of audio and video conferencing makes it more 
difficult for a criminal defendant to confront state witnesses.  Second, the 
extent to which audio and video conferencing negatively impacts the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the type of judicial 
proceeding.  Lastly, the current constitutional tests for finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel are inadequate in cases where audio and video 
conferencing may be used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first-century courtroom has little resemblance to its 
predecessors.  While judges, attorneys, defendants, and an assortment of 
courtroom officials remain as fixtures of the administration of justice, 
technology has ushered a revolution in the practice of law.  In 1998, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts piloted a program that 
would introduce more technology into federal courts.1  The program 
specifically sought to install “monitors, document cameras, video-
conferencing capabilities, and internet connections.”2  The program was an 
early effort to revolutionize courts, and despite funding limitations that 
 
 1 Deborah D. Kuchler & Leslie C. O’Toole, How Technological Advances in the 
Courtroom Are Changing the Way We Litigate, FED’N OF DEF. & CORP. COUNSEL Q., Winter 
2008, at 205, http://kuchlerpolk.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/how_technological_advan
ces_in_the_courtroom_are_changingddk.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKQ5-KPCS]. 
 2 Id. at 205–06. 
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followed, many federal and state courtrooms now include upgraded 
technology.3 
Technological improvements to courtrooms have focused on updating 
technology used for presenting evidence.4  These changes have primarily 
replaced antiquated techniques of presenting evidence to judges and jurors.5  
Whereas whiteboards or chalkboards, hard copies of documents and 
photographs, poster boards, and the like were staples of courtrooms before 
the concerted effort to introduce technology into the courtroom, devices have 
now replaced many of these functions.6  An entirely wired courtroom easily 
includes monitor or screen displays next to the judge, counsels’ tables, the 
jury box, court reporter, deputy, and hanging from the ceiling for the public 
to view.7  Other than viewing displays, the technological upgrades have 
included: annotation monitors allowing witnesses to directly mark exhibits; 
evidence cameras which allow attorneys to ensure that evidence is easily 
viewed and displayed; various inputs and outputs allowing for the use of 
more technology; integrated controls so that judges and courtroom officials 
can control the displayed content; and video and audio conferencing 
capabilities that allow for remote appearances.8 
Audio and video conferencing,9 in particular, has expanded the 
communication reach of modern courts.  This technology allows individuals 
to communicate with each other remotely by both hearing and seeing each 
other.10  Because of its visual and auditory functions, video conferencing is 
 
 3 See id. at 206. 
 4 Id. at 207. 
 5 Id.; see also Jess Scherman, How Courtroom Technology Has Revolutionized Criminal 
Cases, RASMUSSEN C.: JUST. STUD. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.rasmussen.edu/degre
es/justice-studies/blog/courtroom-technology-revolutionized-criminal-cases/ [https://perma.c
c/MN4Z-AF9C]. 
 6 See Scherman, supra note 5; see also Kuchler & O’Toole, supra note 1, at 207–08. 
 7 Kuchler & O’Toole, supra note 1, at 207. 
 8 Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., The Basics of a Technology-Enhanced Courtroom, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2017) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_jour
nal/2017/fall/basics-technologyenhanced-courtroom/ [https://perma.cc/9HMU-WH4L]. 
 9 Throughout this Comment, I use “audio and video conferencing” (or “video or audio 
conferencing”) and “remote appearances” interchangeably. 
 10 CTR. FOR LEGAL & COURT TECH., BEST PRAC. FOR USING VIDEO TELECONFERENCING 
FOR HEARINGS AND RELATED PROC. 25 (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/file
s/documents/Draft_Best%2520Practices%2520Video%2520Hearings_10-09-14_1.pdf [https
://perma.cc/539E-FSZ4]. The report cited here is a draft report. The draft was intended for use 
by The Administrative Conference of the United States’ Committee on Adjudication. The 
Author cites to the draft version of the report, as opposed to the final version, because the draft 
version contained a more comprehensive overview of the relevant subject matter. The final 
version was published on December 5, 2014. 
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superior to technology that only uses audio conferencing because it allows 
individuals to observe the other participants’ facial expressions and physical 
movements, which naturally improves communication.11  While video 
conferencing is superior to audio conferencing, both present similar legal 
problems.  In this Comment, their impact on the judicial process will be 
analyzed simultaneously because the crucial distinction between a remote 
and physical appearance is not the specific characteristics of the mode of 
remote appearance—whether it is audio or video—but instead the fact that 
there is a remote appearance. 
Inherent in the overall increased reliance on technology in the 
courtroom is efficiency.  The use of video and audio conferencing has unique 
benefits.  For one, the legal community widely accepts the premise that 
conferencing via audio and video leads to substantial financial savings.12  
These savings are mainly due to a reduction of travel costs for both the 
attorneys and defendants, especially in cases of incarcerated defendants.13  
Moreover, video conferencing is widely believed to result in reduced travel 
time, more efficient use of judges’ time, scheduling flexibility, and better 
accommodations for participants who are ill or cannot travel.14  This not only 
improves convenience but also has the potential to create efficiencies in 
courtroom proceedings. 
The effects of using video conferencing are not always a net positive.  
Any technology brings a risk for technical problems, and video conferencing 
is no different.  Some of the technical problems associated with the use of 
video and audio conferencing technology include: initial connectivity, 
dropped calls or video, not being able to see or hear the participant, and audio 
or video delays.15  As alluded to above, courts have financial limitations in 
updating courtroom technology.  The actual cost of installing a system 
capable of delivering the type of performance required for a judicial setting 
can be as high as $200,000.16  Courts must determine whether the initial cost 
is worth any future financial savings.17  Given the substantial increase in the 
use of this technology, it appears that some courts have found that having 
video conferencing capabilities is a beneficial cost. 
The uses of this technology have real effects on the judicial system, and 
it is only prudent to consider these effects as the judicial system continues to 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 45. 
 13 Id. at 63. 
 14 Id. at 8. 
 15 Id. at 22. 
 16 Id. at 62. 
 17 Id. at 62–63. 
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embrace technology in the courtroom.18  Nothing is at higher risk than the 
constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel.  While 
technological capability will likely only increase and improve in the future, 
the consequences of its use in the judicial process are still not fully 
understood or tested as they apply to the decision-making process of judges 
and jurors.19  The effect on the adversarial process of the judicial system is 
an extension of that concern.20  Broadly, this Comment aims to explore how 
the use of audio and video conferencing in courts affects the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
In the “Background” section, this Comment introduces the right to 
counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel.  The following 
section examines the Supreme Court case, Wright v. Van Patten, and its 
consideration of how remote appearances affect a defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  Next, the Comment introduces three 
arguments about the use of video and audio conferencing and its effects on 
the effective assistance of counsel.  First, it considers the effect of video and 
audio conferencing on the Confrontation Clause within the context of remote 
appearances.  Next, it explores how different judicial proceedings create 
more or less favorable conditions for the use of remote appearances by 
considering the impact on critical stages of the judicial process.  Lastly, it 
argues that current tests for determining ineffective assistance of counsel are 
inadequate for future uses of technology and also proposes an alternative test.  
This Comment concludes with a final observation on the topic of the use of 
remote appearance technology in courts. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, [a defendant] shall enjoy the right to . . . have 
Assistance of Counsel for [her] defense.”21  The right to  assistance of counsel 
is not an independent right but instead works in tandem with other Sixth 
Amendment guarantees22 to achieve the Amendment’s overall goal of a fair 
trial.  Without the education, knowledge, skills, and expertise counsel 
 
 18 Id. at 23; see also Siri Carpenter, Technology Gets Its Day in Court AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N. (Oct. 2001), https://www.apa.org/monitor/oct01/technology [https://perma.cc/UN8G-
BUW8]. 
 19 See Carpenter, supra note 18. 
 20 Id. 
 21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 22 The Sixth Amendment recognizes that a defendant has the right to a speedy and public 
trial, an impartial jury of her peers, to be informed of the charges against her, to be confronted 
by witnesses testifying against her, and to compel witnesses to testify on her behalf. Id. 
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provides when representing a defendant, the adversarial process envisioned 
by the Amendment would falter.23  Thus, the guarantees in the Sixth 
Amendment are critically dependent on the assurance that a defendant has 
counsel to represent her in criminal prosecutions, making the right to counsel 
indispensable. 
A. THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
While the Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of 
Rights, the Supreme Court did not begin to define the scope of its protections 
adequately until the twentieth century.  Courts mostly believed that the right 
embedded in the Sixth Amendment was a “declaration of the [defendant’s] 
right to counsel,” and not “a duty on the part of the United States to provide 
it.”24  The Court’s recognition that indigent defendants were entitled to an 
appointed counsel profoundly underscored the importance of counsel in a 
trial and also created a duty on the part of the government to provide counsel.  
In the 1938 decision Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that an indigent federal 
defendant had the right to court-appointed counsel.25  The Zerbst Court 
reasoned that the right to assistance of counsel was “one of the safeguards of 
the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to ensure fundamental human right 
of life and liberty.”26  The Court recognized that without counsel defending 
her client, a skilled prosecutor could present a case without any challenge on 
the merits of the presented theory, the introduced evidence, or, more 
generally, the knowledge to navigate the judicial process.27 
In 1963, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right to 
assistance of counsel to indigent defendants in state felony cases.28  It 
recognized that the right to assistance of counsel is fundamental to the 
guarantee of a fair trial and, as such, it must apply to the states.29  Without 
counsel representing a defendant, there would be little assurance that the 
envisioned adversarial process in a fair trial would be possible.30  The Court 
was particularly concerned about the imbalance between the prosecution and 
 
 23 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 24 John Donohue, Effective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal: Due Process Prevails in 
Evitts v. Lucey, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 185, 187 (1985). 
 25 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468–69 (1938). 
 26 Id. at 462. 
 27 See id. at 462–63. 
 28 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 29 See id. at 344. 
 30 See id. 
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the defense if the defendant was not guaranteed representation.31  The 
concern was that the prosecution could always be assumed to have sufficient 
funds to fulfill its societal public safety role, but defendants could not always 
be guaranteed representation if only defendants with sufficient funds were 
able to acquire representation.32  The equity of having counsel represent both 
indigent defendants and those defendants who can afford to hire counsel is a 
fundamental tenet of the Court’s emphasis that “every defendant stands equal 
before the law.”33 
B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
The first mention of effective assistance of counsel is embedded in the 
Powell v. Alabama34 decision.  The Court recognized that in some criminal 
proceedings,35 trial courts must appoint effective counsel to represent 
defendants that neither could afford to hire counsel nor had the intellectual 
ability to present a defense by themselves.36  Notably, the Court reasoned 
that the mere appointment of counsel did not remove the guarantee of counsel 
if counsel could not effectively discharge her duty to prepare and try a case.37  
For example, appointing counsel immediately before a trial begins without 
giving her the opportunity to investigative the pertinent facts, or appointing 
counsel that simply chooses not to investigate the pertinent facts, does not 
satisfy the right to assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, “the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”38  “[I]f the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be 
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and . . . judges should strive to 
maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing 
 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 35 The Court was particularly concerned with cases where the life of the defendant is at 
stake. Additionally, the factual circumstances of the Powell case lended themselves to 
recognizing that defendants needed—and were guaranteed—counsel during their trial. “[T]he 
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, 
the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact 
that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them 
necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives—we think the 
failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a 
clear denial of due process.” Id. at 71. 
 36 See id. at 71–73. 
 37 See id. at 71. 
 38 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 
U.S. 85, 90 (1955)); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69 (1942); Avery v. Alabama 308 
U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). 
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defendants in criminal cases in their cases.”39  The right to effective 
assistance of counsel derives from the right to counsel itself; if a defendant 
is not constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed counsel, she cannot be 
guaranteed effective assistance of counsel.40 
C. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL IN AUDIO AND VIDEO 
CONFERENCING 
While the Supreme Court has not examined a case regarding effective 
assistance of counsel in audio and video conferencing on the merits, in 2007, 
the Court granted certiorari in Wright v. Van Patten,41 which examined the 
issue under the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA).  Given the procedural posture of the case and the resulting 
opinions in state and federal courts that form the primary review of the issue, 
a brief background of the mechanics of AEDPA actions is valuable for 
understanding the relevant case law presented later in this Comment. 
Under AEDPA, a state court claim cannot be overturned by a federal 
court “unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”42  
The Court held that under AEDPA claims, “an unreasonable application of 
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”43  
Therefore, using an objective test, a federal court must find that a state court’s 
interpretation of the federal law was objectively unreasonable to justify 
overturning the decision of the state court.44  Significantly, in the Van Patten 
case, the Court found that the state court, reviewing Van Patten’s claim, 
reasonably interpreted the federal law available to them.45 
In Van Patten, the Court considered whether the state or federal court 
applied the correct test to determine whether the representation of counsel 
was ineffective and thus required a remedy.  The Court applied one of two 
tests.  The test devised in Strickland v. Washington is a test for actual, 
subjective ineffectiveness, and the test in United States v. Cronic is per se, or 
objective, ineffectiveness.  In Van Patten, the Court examined the opinions 
 
 39 McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. 
 40 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1987). 
 41 552 U.S. 120 (2008). 
 42 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(d)(1) (2012). 
 43 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S 362, 410 (2000) (emphasis omitted). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 120. 
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of the Seventh Circuit, which applied the Cronic test, and the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals, which applied the Strickland test.46 
1. Van Patten Background 
Joseph Van Patten was charged with first-degree intentional homicide 
under Wisconsin law.47  He avoided a trial and a likely conviction for first-
degree intentional homicide by pleading guilty to first-degree reckless 
homicide.48  Van Patten’s plea bargain proceeding was the principal concern 
of this case. 
Prior to the hearing, Van Patten’s attorney had negotiated a plea bargain 
with the local prosecutor that required Van Patten to plead no contest to first-
degree intentional homicide.49  The plea would also require “a penalty 
enhancement for committing the offense while using a dangerous weapon.”50  
Van Patten’s attorney discussed the plea with Van Patten over the telephone 
before the hearing.51  At the hearing, Van Patten’s attorney appeared by 
telephone.52 
Van Patten’s attorney’s appearance by telephone instead of in person 
was not due to any last-minute problem.53  Rather, he appeared by telephone 
because of the convenience and benefits to the parties involved, including: 
“appearances in two other counties that day; that the court was holding time 
for Van Patten’s trial; that witnesses were waiting to know whether they 
would be needed; and that everyone wanted to get this matter concluded.”54  
Van Patten was not asked whether he had an objection to his attorney’s 
absence from court, or if he preferred the hearing to be rescheduled for a day 
when his attorney could appear in court.55 
At the hearing, all of the in-court participants huddled around the 
speakerphone to allow Van Patten’s attorney to communicate with them.56  
The presiding judge encouraged Van Patten to take his time to speak to his 
attorney and stated that the court might be able to provide Van Patten the 
 
 46 See infra Sections III.B, III.C. 
 47 State v. Van Patten, No. 96-3036-CR, 1997 WL 277952, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 28, 
1997). 
 48 Id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(1). 
 49 Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1040 (2006). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.; see also Van Patten, 1997 WL 277952, at *1. 
 53 Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1040. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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opportunity to speak privately over the phone.57  No private accommodation 
was provided nor was a private line set up to allow Van Patten to speak to 
his attorney.58  The court assured Van Patten that the hearing would be on 
the record.59  The court also “quizzed” Van Patten about his constitutional 
guarantees and the consequences of pleading instead of going to trial.60  At 
the end of the hearing, the judge accepted Van Patten’s plea and sentenced 
him two months later to twenty-five years in prison.61  Given his sentence, 
Van Patten retained other counsel and claimed that the absence of his 
attorney at the plea hearing violated his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.62  Van Patten stated that he felt pressured to accept the plea 
because his attorney believed that if he did not plead, he would spend the rest 
of his life in prison.63  Notably, Van Patten stated that he would not have 
accepted the plea had his attorney appeared in court in person.64 
2. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin Review of State v. Van Patten 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed Van Patten’s assertion that 
his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated when his 
attorney appeared at the plea hearing by telephone.65  The Wisconsin court 
applied the Strickland test.66  In Strickland, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of inadequate representation.  The Court formulated a two-prong test to 
examine whether the representation of counsel was inadequate enough to 
require a judicial remedy.67  First, there must be a showing that the 
performance of counsel was deficient (performance prong).68  Second, there 
must be a showing of prejudice stemming from the deficient performance 
(prejudice prong).69 
The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly require that the representation 
of counsel is effective.  However, the professional standards of the legal 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1041. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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profession implicitly require that lawyers meet certain benchmarks.70  The 
Court determined that the effectiveness of counsel is measured by 
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”71  Thus, to prove that 
counsel was ineffective, a defendant must prove that the “representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”72 
Counsel representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding must 
advocate for her client’s cause, consult with the defendant about critical 
decisions, and communicate with the defendant about the case.73  More 
generally, counsel has a duty to use her education, skills, knowledge, and 
expertise to ensure a “reliable adversarial testing process” in all criminal 
proceedings.74  The Court reasoned that the determination of whether counsel 
was effective or ineffective could not be an exhaustive checklist of duties and 
expectations, but instead involves a reasonable consideration of the 
circumstances of each case.75  The consideration of circumstances is 
imperative because the advocacy for and defense of a defendant require that 
counsel has the independence to make decisions about case strategy without 
being hampered by an artificial measurement of her performance.76  
Additionally, the goal of the Sixth Amendment was not to create a framework 
for effective counsel, but instead was to guarantee a fair trial.77  The 
guarantee of a fair trial does not necessitate perfect representation from a 
perfect lawyer but rather that the quality of the representation is sufficient to 
ensure a fair trial. 
The Court held that the examination of counsel’s performance by a court 
has to be highly deferential.78  There must be a strong presumption of the 
effectiveness of counsel, in which it is presumed that the “conduct fall[s] 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”79  A review of 
the effectiveness of counsel has to be specific-fact intensive.  This review 
requires lower courts to look at the facts of the specific cases as the attorney 
saw them at the time of the conduct in question.80  Thus, determining whether 
counsel was ineffective cannot be based on what the court believes the 
 
 70 Id. at 688. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. at 688–89. 
 77 See id. at 689. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 690. 
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attorney should have done, but instead on whether the actions were logical 
steps taken by a legal professional in preparation for a defense. 
The showing of ineffective performance by itself does not necessitate a 
court setting aside a conviction.  A court must find that the performance of 
counsel also prejudiced the defendant’s case.81  The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a fair trial for the defendant.  Even if the defendant’s counsel took 
actions that are reasonably ineffective, so long as the overall trial or 
proceedings were fair, counsel cannot be deemed so ineffective as to result 
in an overturned conviction.82  The Court reasoned that the finding of 
prejudice could not require mere effect on the trial, as that burden would 
always be met, nor could it require a showing that counsel’s conduct more 
likely than not affected the trial, as that standard would be too high.83  Instead, 
the appropriate test is whether there is “reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”84  “[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial or proceeding.85  This 
requires that courts examine all of the available evidence and determine 
whether the attorney’s error rendered a piece of evidence likely to prejudice 
the defendant and affect the outcome of the trial.86 
Applying the Strickland test, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that 
Van Patten’s attorney neither acted outside the standards of reasonable 
representation nor prejudiced his client when he appeared by telephone.87  
The court stated that the record did not show that Van Patten was coerced 
into entering a plea.88  The court also concluded that Van Patten did not show 
any evidence that his attorney’s performance at the plea hearing was deficient 
or that his appearance by itself was so prejudicial as to necessitate 
withdrawing the plea.89  Van Patten appealed the case to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, but the court denied further review, thus letting the Court of 
Appeals decision stand.90 
 
 81 Id. at 692. 
 82 Id. at 691–92. 
 83 Id. at 694. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 695–96. 
 87 State v. Van Patten, No. 96-3036-CR, 1997 WL 277952, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 28, 
1997). 
 88 Id. at *3. 
 89 Id. 
 90 State v. Van Patten, 215 Wis. 2d 425 (1997). 
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3. Federal Review 
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court and a reviewing federal district 
court agreed with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Van Patten appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit.91  The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court 
and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.92  The Seventh Circuit held that the 
proper standard of review was the standard laid out in United States v. 
Cronic.93  Whereas the Strickland test looks at the actual, fact-specific 
performance of counsel to determine her effectiveness, the test in Cronic 
attempts to identify scenarios where per se ineffectiveness of counsel is 
found. 
The Court in Cronic was concerned with the complete breakdown of the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to an adversarial process.94  The Court framed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel as “the right of the accused to 
require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing.”95  This envisioned right does not require that the 
defendant’s counsel put on a defense without any errors, but simply that the 
defense is adequate enough to provide meaningful prodding of the 
prosecution’s case.96  Whereas under Strickland, an error sufficient to 
produce prejudice is essential to prove ineffectiveness of counsel, under 
Cronic the defendant needs to prove that the entire adversarial process was 
virtually nonexistent.97 
The Court in Cronic attempted to identify sufficient prejudice to the 
defendant’s criminal case in order to justify the per se finding of ineffective 
representation.  The Court explained that a complete denial of counsel—at 
the most extreme and obvious—would justify such a per se finding if it 
occurred at a critical stage.98  Likewise, it is justified to find per se 
ineffectiveness if counsel fails to test the prosecution’s case through an 
adversarial process, such as cross-examination.99 
The Seventh Circuit panel reasoned that Cronic applied instead of 
Strickland: 
[W]here there has been a complete denial of counsel; where counsel has been prevented 
from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the prosecution; where counsel 
 
 91 See id.; see also Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 92 Van Patten, 434 F.3d at 1038. 
 93 Id. at 1041. 
 94 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656–57 (1984). 
 95 Id. at 656. 
 96 See id. at 656–57. 
 97 See id. at 656–58. 
 98 See id. at 659. 
 99 See id. 
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entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; or 
under circumstances where although counsel is available . . . the likelihood that any 
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that 
a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct[.]100 
To justify the use of the Cronic test, there must be a finding of facts that 
make it unlikely that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel 
and such a finding then must justify a presumption that the conviction was 
unconstitutional.101 
 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the appearance of Van Patten’s’ 
attorney by telephone during the plea hearing made it impossible for Van 
Patten to have the assistance of counsel “in anything but the most perfunctory 
sense.”102  Van Patten could not turn to his attorney for advice, ask for 
clarifications, be reassured, or discuss any last-minute doubts about the 
plea.103  Additionally, Van Patten’s attorney “could not detect or respond to 
cues from his client’s demeanor that might have indicated he did not 
understand certain aspects of the proceedings, or that he was changing his 
mind.”104  The court was also concerned with the lack of privacy for Van 
Patten and his attorney, especially given that the trial court had not arranged 
“a private line in a private place” through which Van Patten and his attorney 
could communicate without the court “eavesdropping.”105 
The court stated that Van Patten’s claim was not that his attorney’s 
performance was deficient because of inadequate legal judgment or because 
he was misinformed about the consequences of a plea.106  Instead, under the 
circumstances, Van Patten’s attorney could not see or communicate privately 
with Van Patten, which prevented the guaranteed assistance of counsel.107  
Quite pointedly, the court stated that counsel’s actual performance could not 
be acceptable if her means of appearing deprive the defendant of the full 
benefits of her skills at a critical stage of the proceedings.108  According to 
the opinion of the court, no one knows if Van Patten would have taken the 
plea had his attorney been in court during the proceeding.109  It is the presence 
of an attorney that ultimately “enable[s] the accused to know all the defenses 
 
 100 Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101 Id. at 1043. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1044. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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available to him and to plead intelligently.”110  While the court acknowledged 
that an attorney appearing by telephone might have been better than no 
attorney, “the Sixth Amendment requires more than ‘formal compliance’ 
with its guarantees.”111  Thus, allowing an appearance of counsel by 
telephone would “treat [the] assistance of counsel as a formality to be 
overcome through creative use of technology.”112 
The court reasoned that counsel should be as engaged in the adversarial 
process in a plea hearing as she is at a trial because “in both settings, the 
accused is confronted with both intricacies of the law and the advocacy of 
the public prosecutor.”113  Even though a plea hearing is not a trial, it should 
still be treated “as a confrontation between adversaries.”114  In addition to the 
counsel’s role in the adversarial process, in-person appearances allow courts 
to maintain adequate judicial control over the counsel’s performance.115  If 
counsel does not appear in person, the court could miss improper conduct or 
fail to create a record sufficient to review counsel’s actual performance.116  
Moreover, the court—even assuming that counsel could hear every word 
spoken117 in court—may not be able to ascertain whether “the defense 
attorney was hanging on every word, reading documents in another case, 
surfing the web, or falling asleep.”118 
4. The Supreme Court’s Review of Van Patten 
The Supreme Court held that in the absence of precedent that squarely 
addresses the issue in the case, the decision by the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals must stand.119  The Court asserted that no clear precedent indicated 
that the appearance of counsel by telephone “should be treated as a complete 
denial of counsel, on par with total absence.”120  The Court claimed that even 
if it acknowledged that the performance of counsel over telephone could lead 
to worse performance, it did not necessarily follow that counsel was 
 
 110 Id. (quoting White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
 114 Id. at 1045 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 The court is skeptical that this assumption can even be made given an array of the 
technical difficulties that may get in the way. Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2012). 
 120 Id. at 125. 
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completely absent, or that counsel could not assist the defendant.121  “The 
question is not whether counsel in those circumstances will perform less well 
than he otherwise would, but whether the circumstances are likely to result 
in such poor performance that an inquiry into its effect would not be worth 
the time.”122 
Given the lack of concrete guidance on the issue by any precedent, the 
lack of a clear answer from the proceeding, and the fact that this case was 
brought through an AEDPA action, the Court allowed the decision of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals to stand.123  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
chose to apply the Strickland test and correctly found that Van Patten did not 
assert a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.124  The Court also 
pointed out that all the reviewing courts agreed with the assessment that 
under Strickland, the defendant had no viable claim.125 
While the Court rendered the decision per curiam, Justice Stevens 
authored a short but crucial concurrence.  Justice Stevens believed that the 
decision rendered in the case was primarily necessary because of a drafting 
error in Cronic.126  That error was the clarification that the presence of 
counsel during a critical stage required counsel’s physical presence in 
court.127  In 1984, when Cronic was decided, “neither the parties nor the 
Court contemplated representation by attorneys who were not present in the 
flesh.”128  To that end, Stevens believed that the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation in Van Patten v. Deppisch was correct.129  However, given that 
the question for the Court was whether the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was 
objectively unreasonable to apply Strickland, the correctness of the Seventh 
Circuit was irrelevant.  Moreover, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was 
justified in concluding that Cronic did not apply to Van Patten’s case because 
Cronic clearly referenced a complete denial of counsel or a totally absent 
counsel, and it was reasonable to conclude that an appearance by telephone 
was not a complete denial or total absence of counsel.130  Justice Stevens 
underscored that the decision of the Court in Wright v. Van Patten neither 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 127 Id. at 126–27. 
 128 Id. at 128. 
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 130 See id. 
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adopted the interpretation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals nor that of the 
Seventh Circuit.131 
II. ARGUMENTS 
The Van Patten case addresses a much narrower set of circumstances 
than are possible when considering the use of audio and video conferencing, 
namely, who is appearing via video or audio and what type of proceedings 
are they engaging in. 
In Van Patten, Van Patten’s attorney appeared remotely while Van 
Patten was present in court.  However, the use of this technology also 
presents the possibility that the attorney is physically in the courtroom while 
the defendant appears remotely, or that both counsel and defendant appear 
by video or audio separately or together.  For this Comment, when I refer to 
a “Type I” relationship, I am referring to an attorney that is physically in a 
courtroom and a defendant that is appearing remotely via video or audio.  I 
will refer to a relationship like the one in Van Patten, where the defendant 
appears in person and his attorney appears remotely, as a “Type II” 
relationship.  Lastly, a “Type III” relationship is one where both the attorney 
and the defendant appear remotely but at different locations, and a “Type IV” 
relationship is one where they appear remotely but are in the same location. 
Other than the four possible categories of appearances, to fully 
appreciate the consequences of using video or audio conferencing, it is 
imperative to consider at what point in the judicial process the remote 
appearance occurs. More specifically, one must consider at what time the 
right to effective assistance of counsel attaches to the defendant, the 
implications of that attachment, and the effects of using remote conferencing 
at any specific stage of judicial proceedings. 
A critical component of analyzing how each stage impacts the use of 
video or audio conferencing is how counsel and defendant communicate with 
each other.  Assuming that communication between counsel and defendant 
is fundamental to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel, audio and video conferencing in court poses a variety of problems 
for this communication.  These problems stem from differences between 
when counsel is with the defendant and when she is not.  Some of these 
problems include: the ability of the defendant to ask a question without 
disrupting the court, the ability to speak directly without any possibility of 
interference from a poor connection or noise, and the visual cues given by 
the defendant to counsel.  Some of these problems would be significantly 
more problematic if the court used audio conferencing instead of video 
 
 131 Id. at 128–29. 
672 VALCHEV [Vol. 110 
conferencing, or if counsel and defendant are denied a private space to 
communicate.  Types I, II, and III present the greatest threats to clear and 
private communication between counsel and defendant.  Type III would 
arguably be the worst of the three because both counsel and defendant would 
appear via audio or video conferencing.  Type IV allows counsel and 
defendant to have a relationship that is the same as it would be had they both 
physically appeared in court.  However, in this scenario, both counsel and the 
defendant would be absent from the court. 
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IMPACTS THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING AUDIO AND VIDEO 
CONFERENCE APPEARANCES 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”132  The Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause was to: 
prevent depositions on ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the [defendant] in lieu 
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused 
has the opportunity, not only of testing recollection and sifting the conscience of the 
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury, in order that may 
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand, and the manner in which he 
gives his testimony, whether is worth of [belief].133 
In a later case, the Supreme Court summarized the elements of 
confrontation as: physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and 
observation of demeanor.134  Notably, one of the assurances of the 
Confrontation Clause is that a defendant may cross-examine a witness.  The 
promise that a defendant is guaranteed the right to cross-examine a witness 
underscores the role of an effective counsel. 
In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court examined the implications of 
the Confrontation Clause on the use of teleconferencing testimony in cases 
where juvenile victims of sexual abuse were allowed to testify against their 
abuser.135  In this case, the Court examined whether the right to confront a 
witness face-to-face is absolute.136  Even though it affirmed its precedent that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant is able to confront a 
witness against her face-to-face, the Court held that the guarantee may have 
 
 132 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 133 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 134 Id. at 846. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 844. 
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exceptions.137  The Court reasoned that while its precedent had a preference 
for face-to-face confrontation at trial, “a preference must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”138  
The Court held that the right to confront one’s witness may be satisfied absent 
a physical presence of the witness “only where denial of such confrontation 
is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the 
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”139 
For this Comment, the Confrontation Clause is essential in two respects: 
allowing the defendant to exercise (1) her right to confront a witness 
testifying against her by effective cross-examination from counsel, and (2) 
her right to confront a witness testifying against her face-to-face. 
First, the effectiveness of the cross-examination performed by counsel 
is most at risk when counsel is not present in court.  To that extent, Types II, 
III, and IV are most vulnerable to criticism as to the effectiveness of the 
performance of counsel.  Counsel that appears in court via audio or video 
will likely not be able to observe visual cues from a witness, present 
evidence, or ask questions that rely on a witness observing documents before 
answering a question.  In instances where the adversarial process requires 
that counsel use her skills to probe the prosecution’s case with the testimony 
of an adverse party, the physical absence of counsel will likely impact her 
effectiveness.  Therefore, during a trial, where it is nearly certain that 
witnesses will testify, the absence of an attorney in court is problematic.  The 
same problem extends to any hearing where a witness may testify, such as a 
preliminary hearing.  The Type I relationship, therefore, is the least 
problematic if the ability to cross-examine is the central concern of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
 If, however, the central concern is the face-to-face confrontation 
between the defendant and the witnesses testifying against her, any time the 
defendant appears in court via audio or video will create a significant strain 
on the ability to fulfill the Confrontation Clause.  Every type except Type II 
would place a strain on the Confrontation Clause.  The strain would be 
greater if only audio is used instead of audio and video.  But for the same 
reasons that the court prefers the physical presence140 of a witness over 
appearance via video, video conferencing is unlikely to resolve the central 
problem that the witness and the defendant will not be in the same physical 
location. 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 849. 
 139 Id. at 850. 
 140 See supra notes 137–139.  
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No type of relationship between counsel and defendant via audio or 
video conferencing squarely allows the Confrontation Clause to work as 
intended in court.  Thus, in criminal proceedings where the testimony of a 
witness is fundamental, the use of audio and video conferencing should be 
scrutinized with care.  Type I is the least problematic because it allows 
counsel to probe the witnesses’ testimony.  It also fulfills one critically 
important function of the adversarial process because counsel appears in 
court physically.  Even though the defendant may not appear in person, her 
counsel would still maintain an adversarial process.  This type of 
arrangement may also be the least offensive to the Confrontation Clause 
because it is the defendant that is not in court.  Since the right to appear 
belongs to the defendant141 and not the witness, the defendant could appear 
via video and have her counsel confront the witness in court with the proper 
waiver. 
B. THE RISK TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL WITH 
APPEARANCE VIA AUDIO AND VIDEO IS REDUCED AT THE 
EARLIEST STAGES OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND AFTER A 
TRIAL 
The right to counsel is not limited to a trial.  The right attaches at the 
“time . . . or after the initiation of the adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings,”142 or at any “critical stage143 of the prosecution.”144  The Kirby 
v. Illinois Court was explicit in its characterization that the attachment of the 
right to assistance of counsel at the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings 
is not merely formalistic.145  Instead, the initiation of such proceedings is 
analytically essential because it represents the commitment of the 
 
 141 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(2) (“If defendant waives right to be present, the trial may 
proceed to completion . . . during the defendant’s absence.”). By inference, if a defendant can 
waive her right to appear physically, a defendant can waive physical appearance while then 
appearing via audio or videoconferencing. The appearance via audio and videoconferencing, 
unlike a complete absence, still allows the defendant’s involvement in a proceeding. See 
generally Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant can implicitly waive his right to 
be present by conduct); Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1934) (“[D]efendant [has the 
right] to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably 
substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”).  
 142 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
 143 “The determination whether the hearing is a critical stage requiring the provision of 
counsel depends . . . upon an analysis whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s 
rights inheres in the confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.” 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 144 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690. 
 145 Id. at 689. 
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government to bring forth charges against a defendant.146  From that point, 
the defendant is subject to legal procedures that she may not understand and 
that may substantively affect her life and liberty.147  The need for counsel to 
guide the defendant through the adversarial judicial system implicates the 
Sixth Amendment and, more specifically, the right to counsel.148 
The Court in Rothgery v. Gillespie affirmed the decision in Kirby and 
clarified the meaning of initiation of judicial criminal proceedings.149  The 
start of the criminal proceedings is not marked by the acknowledgment of or 
any actions taken by a prosecutor, but instead by the appearance of the 
defendant before a judge or magistrate.150  While the right to counsel attaches 
at the beginning of these judicial appearances, counsel need not be present at 
the time of attachment.151  Instead, “counsel must [merely] be appointed 
within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate presentation 
at any critical stage before trial, as well as trial itself.”152  The attachment of 
the right to counsel, then, is separate from the actual presence of counsel 
representing a defendant during a judicial proceeding. 
The Court in United States v. Wide opined that it was necessary to 
“scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the [defendant] to determine whether 
the presence of [her] counsel is necessary to preserve [her] basic right to a 
fair trial as affected by [her] right . . . to cross-examine . . . and to have 
effective assistance of counsel at . . . trial.”153  This requires careful analysis 
of any “substantial prejudice to [a] defendant’s rights . . . in the particular 
confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid the prejudice.”154  The 
importance of the right to counsel in a pre-trial proceeding is derived from 
the potential adverse effects of pre-trial judicial decisions on the trial itself.155  
A defendant cannot be guaranteed a fair trial, even one in which counsel 
appears, if the defendant has had to navigate the process leading up to the 
trial without any representation.156 
Critical stages have a key and outsized role in the analysis of the use of 
audio and video conferencing because each stage creates unique 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. at 689–90. 
 148 See id. 
 149 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). 
 150 See id. at 198–99. 
 151 See id. at 211–12. 
 152 Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
 153 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 226. 
 156 See id. at 226–27. 
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circumstances that could make it more or less likely that the use of the 
technology passes constitutional muster.  The right to effective assistance of 
counsel attaches so early in criminal proceedings157 that it is inherently 
difficult to determine whether a court would allow counsel or a defendant to 
appear via audio or video by just considering the type of proceeding.  
However, examining the general characteristics of proceedings that are 
considered critical stages and the level of need for an adversarial process in 
each proceeding yields at least some useful guidelines.  For example, if there 
is no need for cross-examination during a proceeding, the ability of counsel 
to maintain an adversarial process is not reduced, per se, just because she 
may appear via video or audio.  However, as the Seventh Circuit158 
suggested, there may be proceedings like a plea hearing in which the stakes 
for the defendant are higher159 and the need for counsel may be greater even 
though cross-examination may not be necessary. 
A trial is a type of proceeding where counsel should appear in person 
given that the defendant’s freedom and life are at stake at this stage. 
Additionally, the need for counsel to appear in person may be stronger in 
other proceedings that also impact the freedom of the defendant.  For 
example, during a plea hearing or sentencing, the impact of the judgment is 
more significant than it is during an initial appearance, a status hearing, or 
any other pre-trial proceedings as long as no witnesses are testifying.  Only 
with representation throughout the entire judicial process can the defendant’s 
“interests . . . be protected consistently with [an] adversary theory of criminal 
prosecution.”160  At each of the critical stages discussed below, a defendant 
is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, but not in all is the presence of 
counsel or defendant necessary for the successful protection of the defendant. 
The Powell v. Alabama Court stated: 
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against [a defendant], that 
is to say, from the time of [her] arraignment until the beginning of [her] trial, when 
consultation, thorough-going investigations and preparations were vitally important, 
the defendant[] did not have the aid of counsel . . . although [she was] as much entitled 
to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.161 
 
 157 See infra notes 142–152. 
 158 Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1038 (2006). 
 159 At a guilty plea hearing, the defendant admits guilt and her freedom and liberty are at 
stake. The defendant effectively allows the state to take away her freedom and liberty without 
a trial. There is also a liberty interest during a sentencing hearing because the length of the 
sentence matters a great deal to the defendant. Given the sometimes-varying sentencing 
guideline ranges, a defendant receiving the lower end of the range is preferable, and only 
counsel can fully advocate for the lower range. 
 160 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 161 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
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In Brewer v. Williams, the Court added, “Whatever else it may mean, 
the right to counsel . . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of 
a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated 
against [her] whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.”162 
The Court in Coleman v. Alabama held that a defendant is entitled to 
counsel even if the initial hearing with a judicial officer is not a requirement 
of prosecution under state law.163  The Court advanced four arguments 
buttressing the benefits of having counsel at such a critical stage of 
proceedings.  First, counsel could expose weaknesses in the state’s case that 
would make it unlikely that an indictment is issued at all.164  While the role 
of counsel here may seem strong, in practice a defense attorney is unlikely to 
convince a prosecutor to drop the charges against a defendant this early in 
the process.  Thus, even if counsel appeared remotely, it would be highly 
unlikely that the remote appearance would have any effect on whether or not 
the proceedings continue against the defendant.  Second, the Court held that 
during the initial hearing, counsel could elicit impeachable testimony from 
state witnesses that would testify at trial or preserve useful testimony from 
witnesses that may not appear at trial.165  Here, a remote appearance of 
counsel may greatly disadvantage a defendant because of the need to cross-
examine or probe witnesses.  So if the initial hearing does have witnesses, 
the need for counsel to appear in person is greater.  Nonetheless, it likely does 
not rise to the same need as in a trial. 
Third, counsel could determine the prosecution’s theory early in the 
process and build a defense to address this theory.166  The formation of a trial 
theory is pertinent to how counsel will conduct herself throughout the 
adversarial process, but a remote appearance is unlikely to affect counsel’s 
understanding of the theory of the case solely because of the lack of physical 
presence. 
Lastly, the Court held that counsel could more effectively advocate for 
necessary testing for trial or advocate for fairer bail for the defendant.167  The 
 
 162 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
 163 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970). Under Alabama law, the initial hearing serves two purposes. 
First, it is to determine whether there is enough evidence for a grand jury to issue an indictment 
against the defendant. Second, if the court finds that there is sufficient evidence for a grand 
jury to indict and the grand jury does indict, then the hearing also involves the determination 
of bail. 
 164 Id. at 9. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
678 VALCHEV [Vol. 110 
Court is indeed correct that counsel can advocate for testing and fairer bail, 
but there is little indication that physical presence will make it any more 
likely that the defendant would receive more testing or a fairer bail. 
Similarly, an arraignment is also considered a critical stage.  In 
Hamilton v. Alabama, the Court held that a defendant is entitled to counsel 
during her arraignment.168  The Court reasoned that the presence of counsel 
is necessary to avoid the prejudice of not exercising an available defense 
during the arraignment or simply to ensure that the defendant pleads 
intelligently after receiving her counsel’s advice.169  An arraignment is a 
critical stage of a judicial proceeding because it can affect the outcome of a 
trial.170  Generally, the need for counsel at this stage is similar to the need 
during an initial hearing.  Thus, the reduced need for the physical presence 
of counsel is comparable in two ways: (1) the remote appearance of counsel 
is unlikely to increase the net benefit of their appearance during the 
proceedings, and (2) the efficiency created by the possibility of counsel 
appearing remotely is strong and compelling.  One possible difference is the 
need to communicate with and advise the defendant privately.  Because a 
defendant is generally required to plead guilty or not guilty during the 
process, communicating with counsel is a significant consideration that is 
impacted regardless of whether the defendant or counsel appears via video 
or audio.  At this stage, if both counsel and defendant are together and appear 
via audio or video, then the communication consideration is unnecessary 
because counsel and defendant can communicate freely. 
Initial hearings and arraignments are perfect examples of proceedings 
where the use of video or audio conferencing may bring efficiency to the 
judicial process.  Given the nature of initial hearings and arraignments—
attorneys cannot predict when someone will get arrested or formally 
indicted—having the flexibility to have counsel appear from anywhere, at 
any time, to represent a defendant during these stages is a net benefit for the 
judicial process and defendants. 
Other than the trial, the process of negotiation and entry of guilty pleas 
and sentencing represent stages where the expertise and skills of counsel 
greatly impact the defendant.  As such, the need for the physical presence of 
counsel is likely greater than it is for initial proceedings. 
 
 168 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 54. 
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The Court has implicitly held that a defendant is entitled to counsel 
during the negotiation or entry of a guilty plea.171  In examining the 
effectiveness of counsel pertaining to plea bargains, the Court showed that it 
had determined that plea proceedings entitle defendants to the right to 
counsel.  If the Court had determined that plea bargains were noncritical 
stages of judicial proceedings, then it would not have examined the 
effectiveness of counsel in relation to the plea proceedings.  The Court has 
also found that a defendant is entitled to counsel during sentencing 
proceedings for both capital and noncapital cases because the length of a 
defendant’s sentence is at stake.172  “Even though sentencing does not 
concern the defendant’s guilt or innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel 
during a sentencing hearing can result in [] prejudice because any amount of 
additional jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”173 
Both the negotiation and entry of a guilty plea and sentencing require a 
sophisticated level of communication from counsel.  Informing a defendant 
about the consequences of a guilty plea is of the utmost importance for the 
defendant and the fairness of the judicial system.  All precautions should be 
taken to ensure that counsel can communicate with her client about the 
expected outcomes of the guilty plea, whether they impact the appeals 
process or the years served in prison.  The same is true during the sentencing 
process.  Communication between counsel and defendant is a significant 
component of what occurs during these two stages, and therefore the remote 
appearance of either counsel or defendant should be scrutinized. 
Critical stages are not limited to pre-trial and trial proceedings.  A 
defendant is entitled to representation by counsel at her appeal because a 
layperson is generally not equipped to present an appeal case effectively.  The 
process is a “perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond the 
competence of individuals . . . who have little education, learning 
 
 171 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012) (“[R]espondent has shown that but for 
counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability he and the trial court would 
have accepted the guilty plea.”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010) (“The 
consequences of [the defendant’s] plea could easily be determined from reading the removal 
statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was 
incorrect.”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S 759, 770 (1970) (“In our view a defendant’s 
plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack 
on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s 
confession.”). 
 172 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165. 
 173 Id. (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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disabilities, and mental impairments.”174  At this stage, the need for counsel 
to be physically present may be critically important because of counsel’s 
relationship with the court.  During an appellate argument, counsel would be 
in a better position to react and respond to questions from the court and the 
opposing side.  Even though this stage is of great importance to the defendant, 
the defendant’s communication with counsel during the process is reduced 
because of the nature of the proceedings.  Appellate proceedings are about 
legal arguments and exposing errors in judgment during the trial process.  
Therefore, the defendant’s presence is less important to the outcome of the 
proceeding.  In these types of proceedings, having the defendant appear via 
video or audio from prison would likely be acceptable without any major 
effect on the effectiveness of counsel because of the remote appearance.  
Moreover, at this stage, the defendant will not confront any witnesses as she 
would have in prior stages. 
Finally, the right to effective counsel in probation and parole 
proceedings is not a guaranteed right, but instead a case-by-case 
determination that depends on the circumstances and seriousness of the 
revocation.175  “[C]ertain cases in which fundamental fairness [is] the 
touchstone of due process . . . will require the state [to] provide at its expense 
counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”176  The Court did not attempt 
to formulate a manner in which officials could determine the necessity of 
counsel for probation and parole revocation.177  Since these two proceedings 
require a case-by-case determination as to whether counsel is guaranteed, the 
ability of counsel or defendant to appear remotely is less likely to be 
problematic.  While the need for communication between counsel and 
defendant is strong, the concern that the freedom of the defendant is at stake 
is reduced.  Regardless of whether the defendant is paroled or on probation, 
she is still under the custody or care of the state.  The overall stake of losing 
one’s freedom is not the same here as it is before and during a trial, a guilty 
plea, or the sentencing process. 
 
 174 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005). “Michigan’s very procedure for 
seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea, moreover, may intimidate the uncounseled.” 
Id. at 622. 
 175 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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C. NEITHER STRICKLAND NOR CRONIC CAN ADEQUATELY ASSESS 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL WHEN CONSIDERING 
AUDIO AND VIDEO CONFERENCING 
Testing a counsel-defendant relationship using the Strickland test is a 
fact-specific exercise.  Thus, appearing by video or audio by itself would not 
lead to an overturned conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Instead, the court would have to find that the attorney’s performance via 
video or audio was unreasonable and that the performance prejudiced the 
defendant.  The likelihood that a court could find a lackluster performance 
and prejudice is higher for Types II, III, and IV, where counsel would not be 
physically present in court.  However, a likely increase in possibility hardly 
makes it overall more likely that a court would find ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The court would have to examine, for example, the need to cross-
examine, the type of proceeding, and the ease or availability of 
communication between the defendant and her counsel.  The performance of 
an attorney may be found to be substandard over video or audio if counsel 
was not able to cross-examine a witness thoroughly during a proceeding 
where cross-examination is a component.  Substandard performance could 
also be found if an unstable connection prevented counsel and defendant 
from communicating about the proceedings in real time as in a plea 
bargaining setting or sentencing.  Yet the Strickland test as currently applied 
does little to consider that there are real differences in how counsel fulfills 
her duties depending on whether she appears remotely or in person.  Thus, 
the Strickland test generally seems to underestimate the possible 
repercussions of an attorney who is not present in court. 
In contrast, under the construction of Cronic presented by Justice 
Stevens and the Seventh Circuit, it is hard to imagine that counsel appearing 
via video or audio would ever survive constitutional muster.  To that extent, 
the Cronic test has the opposite flaw of Strickland—it overestimates the 
impact of counsel appearing remotely instead of in person. 
Under Cronic, Types II, III, and IV would likely be unconstitutional 
because counsel does not physically appear in court.  Type I may survive 
Cronic, but both Stevens and the Seventh Circuit suggested that the 
requirement that counsel appear in court physically also means that counsel 
appears in court physically alongside her client.  Justice Stevens claimed that 
the Seventh Circuit “assumed that the constitutional right at stake was the 
right to have counsel by one’s side at all critical stages of the proceeding” 
and presence of counsel meant physical presence in court.178  If that holds 
true, even a Type I relationship may be struck down because the defendant 
 
 178 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 127–28 (2008). 
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does not get the benefit of being physically next to her counsel, including the 
benefit of communicating about the proceedings.  Under this construction, 
counsel’s presence in court does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
in itself because the defendant does not get the benefit of counsel next to her.  
If the Court determines that counsel appearing via video or audio results in 
per se ineffective assistance of counsel, then it would inadequately adapt to 
the ever-increasing use of technology in courts.  That type of decision would 
foreclose the application of technology in all proceedings that entitle or could 
entitle a defendant to assistance of counsel.  As discussed in the previous 
subsection, not every judicial proceeding presents unequivocally harmful 
effects on counsel or the defendant appearing in court via video or audio 
conference. 
Alternatively, the Court should find that the test in Cronic is broader 
than the one recognized by Justice Stevens and the Seventh Circuit.  This test 
would allow a broader interpretation of the presence requirement to 
encompass both a physical presence and a presence in mind.  A broader 
interpretation of Cronic would be more consistent with the language that only 
finds per se ineffectiveness of counsel if there is a complete denial or absence 
of counsel.179 
If courts simply examine whether there was a complete denial or 
absence of counsel, then appearance via audio or video conference would 
likely not be deemed per se ineffective because the defendant was 
represented by counsel.  While this may be a satisfactory result because it 
allows representation that involves audio and video conferencing, it tends to 
oversimplify the issue.  While the result of the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation is unsatisfactory, the court’s concern that it would lack 
oversight over an attorney appearing via audio and video is valid.  One way 
to remedy this concern is to have the reviewing court determine if the counsel 
appearing via audio and video conferencing appears engaged in the 
proceeding, i.e. if she is present in mind.  If the court finds that counsel was 
engaged in the proceeding, actively probed the prosecution’s case, and was, 
in general, aware and responsive to the proceedings, then it cannot find a per 
se ineffectiveness.  This type of first step would allow courts to acknowledge 
that the appearance via video or audio is partially different from an in-person 
appearance, but not such that courts necessarily need either an automatic 
finding of a per se ineffectiveness or direct examination under Strickland.  If 
the Court did find that the first step was satisfied, namely that counsel who 
appeared remotely was at least present in mind, then an application of 
Strickland as a second step would complete the analysis. 
 
 179 See supra Section I.C.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable that courts will increasingly utilize technology during the 
judicial process.  The ability of courts to have counsel and defendant appear 
remotely offers greater flexibility for courts and shows promising 
efficiencies.  However, courts do not operate outside the restrictions 
prescribed by the Constitution.  The fairness of the criminal justice system is 
dependent on constitutional guarantees that should not be lessened in the 
name of the efficiency or flexibility without careful consideration and 
without taking the necessary precautions to preserve the full scope and 
efficacy of these guarantees.  Audio and video conferencing can improve the 
criminal justice system as long as defendants can depend on the 
uncompromising right to effective representation.  To that end, courts should 
define the constitutional parameters of remote appearances.  Without 
concrete guidance and a decision on the merits from the Supreme Court, more 
questions remain than are answered.  This Comment has attempted to 
propose ways that courts could analyze the effect of remote appearances on 
the right to effective counsel.  It has also provided several considerations in 
that analysis. 
Twenty-first-century courtrooms may be significantly different from 
their eighteenth century counterparts, but the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution in criminal proceedings remain constant.  The inherent 
challenge is to find the precise limit of an administration of justice that is able 
to continuously adapt to technological advances in a manner that still 
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